The Authority Speaks and the Response Waits

Paul M. Esber

National Flag of Lebanon

Last week, Lebanon’s Legislation and Consultations Authority responded to questions raised by Interior Minister Ahmad Hajjar: (1) would citizens residing abroad who had registered to vote in the upcoming legislative elections be able to vote for all 128 parliamentary seats, as occurred in 2022? And if the answer to this question was negative; (2) would these registered members of the diaspora be required to return and vote physically in Lebanon? The Authority’s answer was that the right to vote is constitutionally guaranteed to all Lebanese citizens, including those residing in the diaspora. However, in the wake of the Authority’s answer the electoral picture in Lebanon has shifted rather than clarified. There are at least three interlocked components to this shift: domestic convergence, external pressures, and the absence of implementation decrees.

Domestic Convergence

First, there appears considerable convergence among domestic political actors that the elections should be held on time for both internal and external voters. These actors include President Joseph Aoun, the Shia “Duo” of Amal and Hezbollah, and the Lebanese Forces. President Aoun since his inauguration speech has been a vocal advocate of greater diasporic participation in all forms of Lebanese life including politics. His stance in favour of both assimilated diasporic representation (voting for all 128 MPs in the 15 domestic districts), and on-time elections is well known. In this he is joined by his Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, whose government publicly declared its support for assimilated representation in November 2025. Further, the Progressive Socialist Party, via member of parliament (MP) Bilal Abdullah have announced its intention to release its candidate lists soon. A sign that it is prepared for elections to be held on-time.

The Shia Duo’s general position has been expressed by Parliamentary Speaker and head of the Amal Movement, Nabih Berri. For more than a year, Berri has been adamant that the diaspora’s participation in the 2026 legislative elections would be channelled through the extraterritorial “District 16” in line with the existing Elections Law (No.44/2017). Recently however, Berri’s discourse has shifted from this emphasis on District 16 to one which sees the elections held on time irrespective of the diasporic voting mechanism to be used. Three calculations underscore this change in perspective: raw numbers, likely voting stance, and the quest for legitimacy.

Regarding the raw voting numbers, the overall number of registered diasporic voters is lower than that witnessed in 2022. In total 152,050 citizens abroad have registered to vote in comparison with 230,446 (valid) in 2022. A lower turnout from abroad theoretically means a reduced electoral impact regardless of voting stance. Concerning which, unlike 2022, when an overwhelming majority of registered citizens abroad voted against the status quo - to the electoral detriment of the Shia Duo and their then-ally the Free Patriotic Movement - this time around it seems that a not insignificant number of such voters are prepared to vote in support of Amal’s and Hezbollah’s lists. Putting these two factors together, should this materialise on election day, then the composition of the new parliament is unlikely to be as combative as at present. Finally, electoral participation, and the victories on offer provide a modicum of political legitimacy necessary to underwrite subsequent choices that parties and their leaderships will make between 2026 and 2030.

External Pressures

Also known as security concerns, Lebanon’s history is replete with examples of external developments shaping domestic realities. The road to May’s elections is little different. The Government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is under considerable pressure from foreign donors to hasten the disarmament of Hezbollah, while the risk of a military escalation between the United States of America and Iran hangs overhead. This is to say nothing of Israel who continues to violate its own ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, which has resulted in numerous deaths of Lebanese citizens. Foreign pressure and the risk of war affecting West Asia brings the prospect of electoral rescheduling back to the table despite the apparent domestic convergence towards holding the elections for all citizens on time.

Implementation Decrees, the Missing Piece of the Puzzle

The Salam Government has up until now not released the implementation decrees required for elections to be held in the diaspora. It is therefore unknown whether the example of 2018 and 2022 will be repeated or the extraterritorial District 16 will be implemented. Once the Directorate General of Personal Status finalises the electoral voter lists after March 1^st the Government will be required to release its decrees in order for the Exterior Ministry to mobilise the Countries embassies into action. The longer this takes, the higher the likelihood of the elections being postponed either completely, or for the diaspora.

So, what is to be done? Three options (and possibly more) are available. First, the state could apply the law as it is. Such would bring District 16 with its six diasporic seats into existence, therein increasing the number of parliamentary seats from 128 to 134, and locking diasporic voters into a model of discrete representation. The diaspora, inasmuch as it is represented by the 19 groups behind the ongoing campaign to change the current elections law, is vehemently opposed to this.

Second, Legislative change could be conducted. Because the six seats for the six continents formula is enshrined in the current law, any suspension of elections within this framework requires explicit legislative intervention. Current data suggests this to be the preferred option of the diaspora. The diaspora has appreciated the opportunity to influence parliamentary outcomes via the assimilated representation afforded to them via suspensions to the existing law in 2018 and 2022. Speaker Berri however has made it clear on various occasions that the current parliamentary agenda will not be amended to facilitate a debate on this subject. So legislative change is unlikely in the current climate.

Simultaneously, if the Salam Government wanted to reschedule the elections, then a draft law would have to be introduced to parliament, debated and approved to make the change legal. Given Berri’s steadfastness against any amendment of the existing agenda despite a parliamentary majority to debate a draft bill to change the elections law, it would be extraordinary for the agenda to be modified to postpone the elections. Berri has warned that “whoever wants a postponement must bear the responsibility”, so this remains an unlikely possibility.

Third, crash or crash through with Lebanese panache. As Jasent Antar poetically wrote recently “the Lebanese experience shows that political compromises often take precedence over legal texts”. Thus, the elections could proceed for the diaspora contrary to the terms of the existing law if there is sufficient consensus over what compromises to take. It is here that we wait with bated breath. Although public declarations assert consensus over the benefits of holding the elections on time, how are they to proceed is less lucid. Perhaps only when the Government issues the necessary implementing decrees will the beginnings of a clear answer to emerge.